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Pierre Kloss owski

N IETZSCHE' S EX PERIENCE
OF THE ETE RNAL RETU RN
T o Peter Gast

Sils-Maria, 14 August 1 8 8 1

. . . The August sun is overhead , the year is slipping away , the
mountains and forests are becoming more hushed and more peaceful .
Thoughts have emerged on my horizon the likes of which I ' ve never
seen-I won ' t even hint at what they are , but shall maintain my own
unshakable calm. I suppose now I ' ll have to live a few years longer !
Ah , my friend , I sometimes think that I lead a highly dangerous life ,
since I ' m one of those machines that can burst apart! The intensity of
my feel ings makes me shudder and laugh . Several times I have been
unable to leave my room , for the ridiculous reason that my eyes were
inflamed . Why? Because I ' d cried too muc h on my wanderings the day
before . Not sentimental tears , mind you , but tears of joy , to the
accompaniment of which I sang and talked nonsense , filled with a new
vision far superior to that of other men .
If I couldn ' t derive my strength from myself, i f ! had to depend on the
outside world for encouragement, comfort , and good cheer , where
would I be.! What would I be ! There really were moments and even
whole periods in my life (e . g . , the year 1 87 8 ) when a word of encour
agement, a friendly squeeze of the hand would have been the ideal
medicine-and precisely then I was left in the lurch by all those I ' d
supposed I could rely on , and w h o could have done m e such kindness .
Now I no longer expect it , and feel only a certain dim and dreary
aston ishment when , for example, I think of the letters I get: it's all so
meaningless . Nothing ' s happened to anyone because of me ; no one ' s
given m e any thought . It's a l l very decent and well- intended , what they
write me , but distant , distant , distant . Even our dear Jacob Burckhardt
wrote such a meek and timorous little letter. . . .
FORGETTING AND ANAMNESIS IN THE EXPERIENCE
OF THE ETERNAL RETURN OF THE SAME

The idea of the Eternal Return came to Nietzsche as a sudden awakening,
thanks to a feeling, a certain state or tonal ity of mind . Initially confused

108

THE NEW NIETZSCHE

with this feeling , the idea itself emerges as a specific doctrine; nonetheless ,
it preserves the character of a revelation-a sudden unveil ing . Here the
ecstatic character of this experience must be distinguished from the notion of
the universal ring, a notion that obsessed Nietzsche in his youth , in his
Hellenistic period .
But how does forgetting function in this revelation? More spec ificall y ,
isn ' t forgetting the source and indispensable condition not only for the
appearance of the Eternal Return but for tranforming the very identity of the
person to whom it appears? Forgetting thus raises eternal becoming and the
absorption of al l identity to the level of being .
Isn ' t there a tension implicit in Nietzsche ' s own experience between the
revealed content and didactic message of this content-at least (as an ethical
doctrine) when it is formul ated in the following way : act as though you had
to rel ive your life innumerable times and wish to rel ive it innumerable
times-for, in one way or another, you must recommence and relive it.
The i mperative proposition serves to supplement (the necessary) forget
ting by invoking the will (to power) ; the second proposition foresees the
necessity that was undiscerned in the act of forgetting .
Anamnesis coincides with the revelation of the retu rn . But how can the
return fail to bring back forgetfulness? Not only do I learn that I (Nietzsche)
am brought back to the crucial moment in which the eternity of the circle
culminates-at the very point when the truth of its necessary return is
revealed to me-but , by the same toke n , I learn that I was other than I am
now for having forgotten this truth , and thus I have become another by
learning it. Will I change and forget once more that I will necessarily change
throughout eternity , until I relearn this revelation anew?
The accent must be placed on the loss of a given identity . The ' 'death of
God " (of the God who guarantees the identity of the accountable self) opens
the soul to all its possible identitie s , already apprehended through the diverse
feelings of the Nietzschean sou l . The revelation of the Eternal Return
necessarily brings on the successive realizations of all possible identities:
" All the names of history , finally , are me "-in the end , " Dionysus and the
Crucified . " The " death of God , " then , corresponds to a feel ing in
Nietzsche in the same way as the ecstatic moment of the Eternal Return doe s .
DIGRESSION

The Eternal Return is a necessity that must be willed: only he who I am
now can will the necessity of my return and all the events that have resulted
in what I am-i . e . , inasmuch as the will here supposes a subject . Now this
subject can no longer will itself as it has been up to now , but must will all its
previous possibilities; for, in adopting the necessity of the return as universal
law at the outset, I de- actual ize my present self to will myself in all the other
selves, whose entire series must be gone through so that , following the
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circular movement , I can again become what I am at the moment in which I

discover the law of the Eternal Return .
The moment the Eternal Return is revealed to me , I cease being my own
self, here and now. I am capable of becoming innumerable others , and I
know that I shall forget this revelation once I am outside my own memory .
This forgetting forms the object of my own limits. Likewise , my present
consciousness will be established only in the forgetting of my other possible
identities .
What is this memory ? It is the necessary c ircular movement to which I
yield myself, to which I deliver myself over from myself. Now , if I proclaim
the will-and , will ing it necessarily , I shall have re-willed it-I shall
forcibly have extended my consciousness to this circular movement . And, in
the meantime , even though I were to identify myself with the circle, I would
never re-emerge from this image as myself. In fact , at the moment when I am
struck by the sudden revelation of the Eternal Return, I no longer am . In
order for this revelation to have any meaning , it is necessary that I lose
consciousness of myself, and that the circular movement of the return be
merged with my unconsciousness until such time as it leads me back to the
point where the necessity of l iving through the entire series of my pos
sibilities is revealed to me . All that remain s , then , is for me to re-will myself,
no longer as the outcome of these previous possibil ities , no longer as one
realization among thousands , but as a fortuitous moment the very fortuity of
which entail s the necessary and integral return of the whole series .
But to re-will myself a s a fortuitous moment i s to renounce being myself
once andfor all; it is not the other way around-i . e . , it is not once and for all
that I have renounced being myself. Also , the renunciation must in any case
be willed . Moreover, I am not even this fortuitous moment once andfor all
if, indeed, I must re-will this very moment; one more time! For nothing? For
myself. And here , nothing serves as the circle once andfor all. It is a valid
sign for all that has happened , for all that happens, for all that will ever
happen in the world .
HOW CAN THE WILL INTERVENE WITHOUT FORGETTING
WHAT MUST BE WILLED AGAIN?

Indeed , at the very moment when the circular movement was revealed to
me as necessary , this experience appeared to my life as never having taken
place before ! The high feel ing , the elevated state of soul , was required in
order for me to know and feel the necessity that all things return . If I meditate
upon the elevated state in which the circle is suddenly revealed to me , I
conclude that it is not possible that it has not already appeared to me
innumerable times , perhaps in other forms . But this conclusion is possible
only if I admit that this heightened state i s not my own obsession; that on the
contrary it is the only valid apprehension of being , of reality itself. But I had
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forgotten all about thi s , because it is inscribed in the very essence of the
circular movement that the movement itself be forgotten from one state to
the next (in order that one move on to another state and thus be cast outside of
oneself; the alternative being that everything would come to a halt) . And
even if I didn ' t forget what I had been in this life , I would still have forgotten
that I was cast outside myself into another life in no way differing from the
present one !
At the risk of everything coming to a halt? Is this to say that at the time of
this sudden revelation the movement was arrested? Far from it. For I myself,
Nietzsche , was not able to escape it. This revelation did not occur to me as a
reminiscence , nor as an experience of deja vu . All would stop for me if I
remembered a previous identical revelation that--even though I were to
continually proclaim this necessary return-would serve to keep me within
myself and , thus, outside the truth that I teac h . It was therefore necessary
that I forget this revelation in order for it to be true! For the series that I
suddenly glimpse , the series that I must l ive through in order to be brought
back to the same point , this revelation of the Eternal Return of the same
implies that the same revelation could just as well have occurred at any
other moment of the circular movement. It must be thus: in order to receive
this revelation , I am nothing other than the capacity to receive this revelation
at all other moments of the circular movement: nowhere in particular for me
alone , but always in the movement as a whole.
N ietzsche speaks of the Eternal Return of the same as the supreme thought
and also as the supreme feeling , as the loftiest feeling . Thus, in unpublished
material written at the same time as The Gay Science, he states:
My doctrine teaches: live in such a way that you must desire to l ive
again, this is your duty-you will live again in any case . He to whom
effort procures the loftiest feeling , let him make the effort; he to whom
repose brings the loftiest feeling , let him rest; he to whom the act of
j oining , of following and of obeying procures the loftiest feel ing , let
him obey . Providing that he becomes aware of what procures the
loftiest feeling and that he draws back before nothing . Eternity depends
upon it.
And he had noted earlier that , unlike natures endowed with an eternal soul fit
for an eternal becoming and a future amel ioration , present human nature no
longer knows how to wait. The accent here is less on the will than on desire
and necessity , and this desire and this necessity are themselves tied to
eternity : whence the reference to the loftiest feeling , or, in Nietzschean
term s , to the high feeling-to the elevated state of the soul.
It i s such a high state of the soul , in such a feeling , that Nietzsche lived in
the moment during which the Eternal Return appeared . But how can a state
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o f sou l , a feeling , become a thought, and how can the loftiest feeling-the
highest feeling , the Eternal Return-become supreme thought?
1 . The state of the soul is a fluctuation of intensity .
2 . In order that it be communicable, the intensity must take itself as an
object and thus return upon itself.
3. In returning upon itself, the intensity interprets itself. But how can it
i nterpret itself? B y becoming a counterweight to itself. For this the intensity
must divide , separate , and rejoin: now , this is what happens to it in what
could be called moments of rise and fall . However, this is al ways a matter of
the same fluctuation , of the wave in the concrete sense (and let us simply
note , in passing , the important place that the spectacle of sea waves holds for
Nietzsche ' s reflection) .
4 . But does an interpretation presuppose the search for signification?
Rise and fall : these are designations , nothing else. Is there any signification
beyond this ascertainment of a ri se and fall ? The intensity never has any
sense other than that of being an intensity . It seems that of itself the intensity
has no meaning . What is a meaning , and how can it be constituted? Also,
what i s the agent of meaning?
5. It seems that the agent of meaning , and therefore of signification , is
once again the intensity , and this according to its diverse fluctuations . If by
itself the intensity has no meaning (other than that of being an intensity) ,
how can it be the agent of signification , or be signified as this or that state of
the soul ? A l ittle earlier we asked how it could interpret itself, and we
answered that it must act as a counterweight to itself in its rise and fall , but
this did not go beyond a simple assertion . How , then , can it acquire a
meaning , and how can meaning be constituted within the intensity? Pre
cisely in returning upon itself-indeed , through a new fluctuation in which,
by repeating itself and imitating itself, it would become a sign .
6 . But first of all , a sign traces the fluctuation of an intensity . If a sign
keeps its meaning , it is because the degree of intensity coincides with it. It
signifies only by a new afflux of intensity , as it were , which rejoins its first
trace .
7 . But a sign is not only the trace of a fluctuation . It can j ust as well mark
an absence of intensity . Here , too , what is peculiar is that a new afflux is
necessary , if only to signify this absence .
Whether we name this afflux attention , will , memory , or whether we call
this reflux indifference , relaxation , or forgetfulness , it is always a question
of the same inten sity , in no way differing from the movement of the waves of
the same swell: " You and I , " Nietzsche used to say , " we are of the same
origin ! of the same race ! "
This flux and this refl ux become intermingled , fluctuation within fluctua
tion , and , just like the shapes that float at the crest of the waves only to leave
froth , are the designations left by intensity . And this is what we call thought .
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But nonetheless , there is something sufficiently open in us-we other,
apparently limited and closed natures-for Nietzsche to invoke the move
ment of waves . This is because signification exists by afflux; notwithstand
ing the sign in which the fluctuation of intensity culminate s , signification is
never absolutely disengaged from the moving chasms that it masks . Every
sign ification , then , remains a function of the chaos out of which meaning is
generated .
INTENSITY AS SUBJECT TO A MOVING CHAOS WITHOUT
BEGINNING OR END

An intensity is at work in everyone , its fl ux and reflux forming the
significant or insignificant fluctuations of thought . And while each appears
to be in possession of thi s , in point of fact it belongs to no one, and has
neither beginning nor end .
B ut , contrary to this undulating element, if each of us forms a closed and
apparently limited whole , it is precisely by virtue of these traces of signify
ing fluctuations; i . e . , by a system of signs that I will here name the everyday
code of sign s . So far as the beginning or end of our own fluctuations is
concerned--on which basis these signs permit us to signify , to speak to
ourselves as well as to others-we know nothing , except that for this code a
sign always corresponds to the degree of intensity , sometimes the highest,
sometimes to the lowest: even if this sign be the me, the I, the subject of all
our propositions. It is thanks to this sign , however, which is nothing but an
ever variable trace of fluctuation , that we constitute ourselves as thinking,
that a thought as such occurs to us, even though we are never quite sure that it
is not others who think and continue to think in us. But what is this other w ho
forms the outside in relation to the inside that we hold ourselves to be?
E verything leads back to a single discourse , to fluctuations of intensity that
corre spond to the thought of everyone and no one .
The sign " me " in the everyday code of communication , so far as it
verifies our various internal and external degrees of presence and absence ,
thus assures a variable state of coherence in ourselves and with our surround
ings . Thus the thought of no one , this intensity in itself, without determin
able beginning or end , finds a necessity in him who appropriates it, and
comes to know a destiny in the very vicissitudes of memory and forgetful
ness; and this for the subject or the world at large . For a designation to occur,
for a meaning to be constituted , my will must intervene-but , agai n , it is no
more than this appropriated intensity .
Now, in a feeling , in a state that I will term the loftiest feeling and that I
will aspire to maintain as the highest thought-what has happened? Have I
not exceeded my limits, and by the same token depreciated the everyday
code of sign s , either because thought abandons me or because I no longer
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discern the difference between the fl uctuations from without and from
within?
Up to now , in the everyday sense , thought could always rely on the use of
the term " my self. " B ut what becomes of my own coherence at such a
degree of intensity where thought ceases to include me in the term " myself '
and invents a sign by which it would designate its own self coherency? If this
is no longer my own thought , doesn ' t it signify my exclusion from all
possible coherence? If it is still mine , how is it conceivable that it should
designate an absense of intensity at the highest degree of intensity ?
Let us suppose that the image of the circle is formed when the soul attains
the highest state: something happens to my thought so that , by this sign , it
dies-so that my thought is no longer real ly my own . Or, perhaps , my
thought is so closely identified with this sign that even to invent this sign ,
this circle, signifies the power of al l thought. Does this mean that the
thinking subject would lose his own identity because a coherent thought
would itself exclude that identity? Nothing here distinguishes the designat
ing intensity from the designated intensity-i . e . , nothing serves to re
establi sh the ordinary coherency between self and world as constituted by
ordinary usage . The same circuit brings me back to the everyday code of
sign s , and leaves me once again at the mercy of signs as soon as I try to
explain the events they represent.
If, in this ineffable moment, I hear it said: " You will return to this
moment-you have already returned to it-you will return to it innumerable
times, " as coherent as this proposition seems according to the sign of the
circle from which it flow s , all the while remaining this selfsame proposition ,
so far as this is reall y me in the context of everyday signs , I fall into
incoherency . Incoherency here assumes two forms: in relation to the very
coherence of this thought itself, as well as in relation to the everyday code of
signs . According to the latter, I can only will myself once andfor all; it is on
this basis that all my designations together with their sense are communica
ble . But to will myself again, once more, implies that nothing ever gets
constituted in a single sense, once andfor all. The circle opens me to inanity
and encloses me within the following alternative: either all returns because
nothing has ever made any sense whatever, or else things never make any
sense except by the return of all thing s , without beginning or end .
Here is a sign in which I myself am nothing , that I always return to--for
nothing . What i s my part in this circular movement in relation to which I am
incoherent, or in relation to this thought so perfectly coherent that it excludes
me at the very moment I think it? What is this emblem of the circle that
empties all designation of its content for the sake of this emblem? The soul ' s
elevated state became the highest thought only b y yielding to its own
intensity . In yielding to this state , chaos i s restored to the emblem of the
circ le-i . e . , the source of intensity is joined to the product of intensity .
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By itself, the circle says nothing , except that existence has sense only in
being existence , or that signification is nothing but an intensity . This is why
it is revealed in a heightened state of the soul . But how can intensity attain to
the actuality of the self that , nevertheless, is exalted by this high state? By
freeing the fluctuations that signified it as me so that what is willed again
once more re-echoes its present . What fascinates N ietzsche about this
moment is not the fact of being there, but the fact of returning in what
becomes: this necessity to be experienced and relived defies the will for and
the creation of sense .
Within the circle , the will exhausts itself by contemplating this return
within becoming , and it is revived only in the discordance outside the
circle-whence the constraint exercised by the highest feeling .
The lofty Nietzschean states found their immediate expression in the
aphoristic form: even there , recourse to the everyday code of signs is
presented as an exerc ise in continuall y maintaining oneself discontinuous
with respect to everyday continuity . When these states of feeling blossom
forth into fabulous configurations , it seems as if the flux and reflux of
contemplative intensity seeks to create points of reference for its own
discontinuity . So many elevated state s , so many gods, until the universe
appears as a dance of the gods: the universe being only a perpetual flight

from and rediscovery of itself through a multitude of gods . . . .
This dance of the gods pursuing themselves i s still only a clarification, in
Zarathustra ' s mythic vision , of this movement of flux and reflux , of the
intensity of Nietzschean states, the loftiest of which occurred to him under
the sign of the divine vicious circle .
The divine vicious circle is only a name for the sign that here takes on a
divine countenance , under the aspect of Dionysus: Nietzschean thought
breathes more freely in relation to a divine and fabulous countenance than
when it struggles against itself, as in the trap of its own thought . Doesn ' t he
say , in fact, that the true essence of things is an illusion-an affabulation
by which being represents things, an illusion without which being could not
be represented at all ?
. The exalted state of mind i n which Nietzsche experienced the vertigo of
Eternal Return gave ri se to the emblem of the vicious circle; there , the
highest intensity of thought (self-enclosed , coherent thought) was instan
taneously realized together with a parallel lack of intensity in everyday
expression . By the same token , even the term " me " was emptied of all
content-the term to which , heretofore , all else had led bac k .
In effect , s o far a s the emblem o f the vicious circle serves t o define the
Eternal Return of the same, a sign occurs to Nietzschean thought as an
event, one that stands for all that can ever happen, for all that will ever
happen , for all that could ever happen in the world , or to thought itself.
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THE EXPERIENCE OF ETERNAL RETURN AS
COMMUNICABLE THOUGHT

The very first version Nietzsche gives (in The Gay Science, §34 1 ) o f his
Sils-Maria experience-and later, in Zarathustra-is expressed essentially
as a hallucination: at once , it appears that the moment itself is reflected in a
burst of mirrors . Here it is I , the same " I " who awakens to an infinite
multiplication of itself and of its own life , while a sort of demon (like a genie
of the Thousand and One Nights ) says: You will have to live this life Once
more and innumerable times more . Subsequent reflection declares: If this
thought gained control over you , it would make of you an other.
There is no doubt here that Nietzsche speaks of a return of the identical
self. This is the obscure point that was the stumbling block of his contem
poraries and of posterity . Thus , from the outset, this thought of Eternal
Return was generally considered to be an absurd fantasy .
Zarathustra considers the will a s being bound to the irreversibility of time :
this is the first reflective reaction t o the obsessional evidence . Nietzsche
seeks to grasp the hallucination once more at the level of conscious will by
means of an " analytical " cure of the wil l . What is its rel ation to three
dimensional time (past-present-future)? The will projects its powerlessness
on time and thus gives time its irreversible character. The will cannot stem
the flow of time -the non-willed that time establishes as the order of
accompl i shed fact . The result is the spirit of vengeance in the will w ith
respect to what is immovable or unshakabl e , as well as its belief in the
punitive aspect of existence .
Zarathustra ' s remedy is to re- will the non-willed insofar as he desires to
take the order of accompl i shed fact upon himself and thus render it
unaccomplished-i .e. , by re-willing it innumerable times. This ruse re
moves the " once and for all " character from all events . Such is the
subterfuge that the (in itself unintell igible) Sils-Maria experience first offers
to reflection , to the kind of reflection that hinges on the will.
Such a ruse, however, is only one way of eluding the temptation inherent
in the very re flection upon the Eternal Return : non-action , which
Zarathustra rejects as a fallacious remedy, is no less subject to the same
inversion of time . If all things return according to the law of the vicious
circle , then all voluntary action is equivalent to a real non-action, or all
conscious non-action is equivalent to an illusory action . On the level of
conscious decision , not to act corresponds to the inanity of the individual
will . It would express the sou l ' s intensely elevated state just as much as it
would the decision to pursue an action . So how would re-willing the
re- willed be creative? To adhere to the return is also to admit thatforgetful
ness alone enabled us to undertake old creations as new creations ad
infinitum . Formulated at the level of the conscious, identical self, the
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imperative to re-will would remain a tautology : it seems that this imperative
(although it demands a decision for eternity) would only concern the behav
ior of the will for the interval of an individual life-yet what we live through
every day is exactly the re-willed, the non-willed , and the enigma of
horrifying chance . This tautology is both in the emblem of the circle and in
Nietzsche ' s own thought; and it represents the return of all things as well as
itself.
The parabola of the two opposite paths, rejoining under the arch of a
doorway on whose pediment is inscribed " The Moment " (in Zarathustra ) ,
only serves to recall the image of the aphorism i n The Gay Science: the same
moonlight , the same spider, will return . The two opposite paths, then , are
one . An eternity separates them: individual s , things , events , ascending by
one , redescending by the other, return al ike to the doorway of the moment,
having made a tour of eternity . Whoever halts in this " doorway " is alone
capable of seizing the c ircular structure of eternal time . B ut there , as in the
aphorism , it is stil l the individual self who leaves and returns identical to
himself. Between this parabola and the will ' s cure, by re-willing the re
willed, the connection is certain . Except that it does not carry conviction .
Yet the aphorism claims that in re-willing , the self changes, becomes
other. Here is precisely where th e solution of the enigma resides.
Zarathustra seeks a change not of the individual, but of his will: to re-will
the re-willed non-willed , this is w hat the ' ' will to power" would consist in .
But Nietzsche himself dreams of an entirely different sort of change
through the change in individual behavior . Re-willing the re- willed , if it is
only the will ' s assumption of the non-willed as creative recuperation (in the
sense that the enigmatic , the fragmentary , together with a horrifying chance ,
are all reconstituted into a meani ngful unity) , nonetheless remains at the
level of a " voluntarist" fatalism .
The change of the individual ' s moral behavior is not determined by the
conscious will , but by the econom y of the Eternal Return itself. Under the
emblem of the vicious circle, the very nature of existence (independent of
the human will) and , therefore , also of individual acts , is intrinsically
modified . Nietzsche says in a note as revealing as it is brief: " My overcom
ing offatalism: 1 . By the Eternal Return and by pre-existence . 2. By the
liquidation of the concept of ' wi ll . ' "
A fragment from S ils- Maria, dated August , 1 8 8 1 , states: " The incessant
metamorphosis: in a brief interval of time you must pass through several
individual states. Incessant combat is the means . "
What is this brief interval? Not j ust any moment of our existence , but the
eternity that separates one existence from another .
This indicates that the object of re-willing is a multiple alterity inscribed
within the individual . If this is an incessant metamorphosis, we can under
stand why Nietzsche claims that " pre-existence " is a necessary condition
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for an individual ' s being-as-he-is . Incessant combat would indicate that
from now on the fol lower of the vicious circle must practice this multiple
alterity . But this theme will be taken up later on when he envisages a theory

of the fortuitous case .
These fragments bear so many new elements for developing the thought of
the vicious circle: no longer is it only a matter of the will being faced with
irreversible time-a will that , when cured of its belief in a punitive exis
tence , would break the chains of its captivity by re-willing the non-willed ,
thence t o recognize itself ( within a reversible time) a s W i l l t o Power, as
creative will .
On the other hand , these fragments give an account of a transfigured
existence that-because it is always the circle-wills its own reversibility ,
to the extent that it relieves the individual of the weight of his own acts once
and for all. What is at first sight the most crushing pronouncement
namel y , the endless recommencement of the same a cts. the same
sufferings henceforth appears as redemption itself, as soon as the soul
knows that it has already lived through other selves and experiences and thus
is destined to live through even more . Those other selves and experiences
will henceforth deepen and enrich the only l ife that it knows here and now.
What has prepared the present life and what now prepares it in tum for still
others remains itself totally unsuspected by consciousness .
Re-willing , then, is pure adherence to the vicious circle; to re-will the
entire series one more time -to re-will every experience , all one ' s acts , but
this time , not as mine: it i s precisely this possessiveness that no longer has
any meaning , nor does it represent a goal . Meaning and goal are liquidated
by the circle-whence the silence of Zarathustra , the interruption of his
message . Unless , of course , a burst of laughter can bear all its own bitter
ness.
At this point Nietzsche becomes divided in his own interpretation of the
Eternal Return . The " overman" becomes the name for the subject of Will to
Power, as well as the meaning and the goal for the Eternal Return . The Will
to Power is only a humanized term for the soul of the vicious circle, while
the circle itself is pure intensity without intention . On the other hand , as
Eternal Return the vicious circle is presented as a chain of existence that
forms the very individuality of the doctri ne ' s adherents--those who know
that they have already existed otherwise than they now exist , and that they
will yet exist differently , from one "eternity to another. "
In this way Nietzsche introduces a renewed version of metempsychosis.
The necessity of a purification , and therefore of a culpability , to be
expiated across successive existences before the initiate ' s soul recovers a
pure state of innocence-all this already admits of an immutable eternity
(precisely the kind of ancient schema that has been transmitted to gnostic
Christianity by the esoteric religions of India and Asia) .
-
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But there is nothing of the kind in Nietzsche-neither " expiation" nor
" purification " nor " immutable purity . " Pre-exi stence and post-existence
are always the surplus of the same present existence , according to the
economy of the vicious circle . It supposes that an individual ' s capacity could
never exhaust the full differentiated richness of a single existence , much less
its affective potential . Metempsychos is represents the avatars of an immor
tal soul . Nietzsche himself says: " If only we could bear our immortality
that would be the supreme thing . " Now, this immortal ity is not , for
Nietzsche , properly individual . The Eternal Return suppresses abiding iden
tities . N ietzsche urges the follower (of the vicious circ le) to accept the
dissolution of his fortuitous soul in order to receive another, equally fortu
itou s . Having traversed the entire series , this dissolved sou l must in turn
come back-namely , to the degree of spiritual excitation where the law of
the circle appears .
If the law of the vicious circle dictates the individual ' s metamorphosis,
how can it be willed? Suddenly we become aware of the circle' s revelation:
to remain in this awareness it suffices to live in conformity with the necessity
of the c ircle: to re-will this same experience (the moment when one becomes
him who is initiated into the secret of the vicious circ le) supposes that all the
livable experiences have been lived through . Therefore , all existence previ
ous to this moment-which privileges one existence among thousands-no
less than all that follows , is necessary . To re- will all experiences , all
possible acts , all possible happiness and suffering , means that if such an act
were accompli shed now , if such an experience were now lived , it would
have been necessary both for a series to have preceded it and for others to
follow; not within the same i ndividual , but i n all that belongs to the
individual ' s very potential , so that one day he could find himself one more

time .
THE DIFFERENC E BETWEEN THE ETERNAL RETURN
AND TRADITIONAL FATALISM

Nietzsche completes his thought of fatalism within the image of the circle.
Fatal ism in itself (theJatum ) posits a chain of events that is pre-established
according to a certain di sposition and whose development is real ized in an
irreversible way . Whatever I do and whatever I decide to do , my decision ,
contrary to what I think , obey s a project that escapes me and of which I am
ignorant .
The vicious circle reintegrates the experience of the Jatum (in the form of
a movement without beginning or end) with the play of chance and its
thousandfold combinations as so many series forming a chain . As an image
of destiny , the circle can only be re-willed, for, in any case , it must

recommence .

Pierre Klossowski
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Chance is but one thing for each of the moments ( i . e . , for each individual ,
singular, and therefore fortuitous existence) that compose it. It is by
" chance " that the figure of the circle appears to an individual . Henceforth ,
he will know how to re-will the entire series in order to re-will himself; or, in
other words , by virtue of his very exi stence , he cannot fail to re-will the
entire series that both leads up to and surpasses his own existence .
The feeling of eternity and the eternal ization of desire are merged in a
single moment; the representation of an anterior life and of an ulterior life no
longer concerns a beyond , or an individual self that would attain this
beyond , but , rather, it concerns living the same life , experienced across its
individual differences . The Eternal Return is only the way it unfolds . The
feel ing of vertigo results from the once-and-for-all when the subject is
surpri sed by the whirl of innumerable times . The once-and-for-all disap
pears : intensity itself issues forth as the vibrations of being-an unending
series of vibrations that projects the individual self outside of itself as so
many dissonances . All resounds until the consonance of the moment is
restored-the moment itself in which these dissonances are once again
reabsorbed .
At the level of consciousness , meaning and goal are lost . They are
everywhere and nowhere in the vicious circle , since no point of the circle can
be both beginning and end at once .
Final l y , and from its very inception , the Eternal Return is not a representa
tion , nor is it exactly a postulate . Rather, it is a livedfact-as a thought, it is a
sudden thought. Fantasy or not , the Sils-Maria experience exercises its
constraint as an ineluctable necessity . Alternating between dread and de
light , the interpretations of Nietzsche will be inspired by this moment , by
this fel t necessity .

HOW NIETZSCHEAN FATALISM IS CONCLUDED BY
ELiMINA TING THE CONCEPT OF WILL

Nietzsche does not say that the thought of the Eternal Return and the
pre-existence it presupposes can itself bring fatalism to a close , for, in the
second place , he does say that his fatalism is necessary in order to eliminate
the concept of will . If the thought of the Eternal Return in its various
extensions already abolishes the identity of the self along with the traditional
concept of the wil l , then Nietzsche seems , under the second aspect of his
fatalism , to make an allusion to his own physiology . According to thi s , there
is no will but one of power, and in this context the will is nothing other than
a p rimordial impulse . No moral interpretation grounded on the intellect
could ever suspend the innumerable metamorphoses it live s through , the
shapes it adopts , or the pretexts that provoke them-whether this be an
invoked goal or a meaning that is supposedly given within these metamor-
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phose s , within this impu l se , or even at the level of consciousness . In this
way , fatal ism becomes merged with the impulsive force that , precisely,
exceeds the initiate ' s " w i l l " and already modifies i t , therefore threatening
its very continuous identity .

